Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner
Province of British Columbia
Order No. 216-1998
February 27, 1998
INQUIRY RE: An applicant's request for records related to his complaints
made to the Law Society of British Columbia
Fourth Floor
1675 Douglas Street
Victoria, B.C. V8V 1X4
Telephone: 250-387-5629
Facsimile: 250-387-1696
Web Site: http://www.oipc.bc.ca
1. Description of the review
As Information and Privacy Commissioner, I conducted a written inquiry at the
Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (the Office) on October 31,
1997 under section 56 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act (the Act). This inquiry arose out of a request for review from
the applicant of a decision by the Law Society of British Columbia (the Law
Society) to withhold records in their entirety. The applicant is also
challenging the adequacy of the Law Society's search for records in response to
his access request.
2. Documentation of the inquiry process
On April 16, 1997 the applicant submitted a request under the Act to
the Law Society for access to records pertaining to his October 24, 1996
complaint against the President, the Deputy Secretary, and a member of the Law
Society.
By letters dated April 24 and 28, 1997, the Law Society confirmed that
it was disclosing four records to the applicant but that it was withholding two
records: a letter from an officer for the Ombudsman to counsel for the Law
Society on the basis of section 3(1)(c) of the Act and a memorandum to file
created by Counsel to the Law Society on the basis of section 14 of the Act.
In his May 5, 1997 request for review made to my Office, the applicant
contended that the Law Society had misapplied sections 3(1)(c) and 14 of the
Act to the withheld records and that it had not conducted an adequate search
for records in accordance with a public body's duty to assist under section 6
of the Act.
During the mediation process, the Law Society notified the applicant
that it was also applying section 3(1)(c) of the Act to the memorandum to file
as a reason for refusing disclosure of this record. With the consent of the
parties, the deadline for the inquiry process was extended to October 31,
1997.
It should be noted that, after the inquiry process started, the Law Society
disclosed additional records to the applicant and notified him that a third
record (a letter from counsel for the Law Society to an officer for the
Ombudsman) was being withheld under section 3(1)(c) of the Act.
3. Issues under review and the burden of proof
There are several issues under review in this inquiry. The first two
are the Law Society's application of sections 3(1)(c) and 14 of the Act to a
memorandum to file and section 3(1)(c) of the Act to the two letters between
the officer for the Ombudsman and counsel for the Law Society.
The third issue is the application of section 6 of the Act to the adequacy of
the Law Society's search for records in response to the applicant's April 16,
1997 access request.
The relevant sections of the Act are as follows:
Scope of this Act
3(1) This Act applies to all records in the custody or under the control of a
public body, including court administration records, but does not apply to the
following:
Duty to assist applicants
6(1) The head of a public body must make every reasonable effort to assist
applicants and to respond without delay to each applicant openly, accurately
and completely.
(2) Moreover, the head of a public body must create a record for an applicant
if
(b) creating the record would not unreasonably interfere with the operations of
the public body.
Legal advice
14. The head of a public body may refuse to disclose to an applicant
information that is subject to solicitor client privilege.
Section 57 of the Act establishes the burden of proof on the parties in this
inquiry. Under section 57(1), where access to information in the record has
been refused under sections 3(1)(c) or 14, it is up to the public body to prove
that the applicant has no right of access to the record or part of the
record.
Section 57 of the Act is silent with respect to a request for review about the
issue of adequate search. As I decided in Order No. 103-1996, May 23, 1996,
the burden of proof in such instances is on the public body.
4. Procedural objections
Following the deadline for making submissions, the applicant submitted three
letters challenging specific issues in the submissions that had been made by
the Law Society. A copy of each letter was sent to the Law Society, and its
counsel responded. The applicant has requested that I disregard the
submissions made by the Law Society after the deadline. I have accepted these
"late" submissions.
5. The records in dispute
There are three records in dispute in this inquiry, and they have been
described above.
6. The applicant's case
The applicant has made voluminous submissions, a portion of them in
camera. I have reviewed them carefully but do not consider it necessary to
present his arguments here in detail, because the issues are so clear-cut. His
concern that he did not receive a response to his complaint to the Law Society
against its leading members is not a matter that I can address under the Act.
(Submission of the Applicant, paragraph 7.04)
The applicant's fundamental submission is that the Law Society breached its
duty to assist him and should give him access to all of the records pertaining
to his complaint against its former Treasurer and former Deputy Secretary.
(Submission of the Applicant, paragraph 8.01) His main contention that he
"will not legitimise the Society's mischief by presenting any arguments
relating to the records allegedly withheld under sections 3(1)(c) and 14" is
not helpful. (Submission of the Applicant, paragraph 7.18)
7. The Law Society's case
The Law Society submits that it has made a comprehensive and complete
search for responsive records in accordance with section 6 of the Act.
(Submission of the Law Society, paragraphs 7 to 10; and the Reply Submission of
the Law Society, paragraphs 1 to 4) It argues that its actions are in
compliance with Order No. 176-1997, July 21, 1997; and Order No. 178-1997, July
25, 1997.
The Law Society submits that it has correctly applied section 3(1)(c) of the
Act to the memorandum to file in dispute "on the basis that it relates to a
process initiated by an Officer of the Legislature," that is the Ombudsman. It
argues that this is in compliance with Order No. 170-1997, June 12, 1997. I
have also reviewed an in camera submission from the Law Society on this
point. (Submission of the Law Society, paragraphs 11 to 14)
The Law Society submits, with respect to the memorandum to file, that it can
also be protected from disclosure on the basis of section 14 of the Act, but
that if I conclude that section 3(1)(c) applies, then I need not address the
section 14 issue. My conclusion on this point will be evident below.
(Submission of the Law Society, paragraph 6 and 15 to 17)
8. The Ombudsman's Case
The Ombudsman's submission refers to the confidential nature of her public
obligations and the importance and scope of section 3(1)(c) of the Act.
Because of my findings in previous Orders, as noted above by the Law Society,
there is no need for me to revisit these matters here. (See Order No. 170-1997; and Order No. 188-1997, August 22, 1997)
9. Discussion
The adequacy of a search for records under section 6(1) of the Act is a
question of fact. Based on my review of the evidence filed by the Law Society,
I am satisfied that the search for records was adequate in this case. I accept
that the Freedom of Information Analyst carried out a comprehensive search and
pursued appropriate avenues to obtain files and records (Affidavits of Jason
Eamer-Goult). The applicant alleges that the affidavit sworn October 23, 1997
contains false statements and should be disregarded on this basis. Since there
is insufficient evidence to support such a serious allegation, I am not
prepared to accede to the applicant's request.
I accept the submissions presented by the Law Society and the Ombudsman with
respect to the application of section 3(1)(c) of the Act to two of the records
in dispute. The applicant made no submissions on the application of
section 3(1)(c). Based on my review of the records in dispute, there is no question
that the letter from the officer for the Ombudsman to counsel for the Law
Society and the counsel's response to the officer for the Ombudsman's are
excluded from the application of the Act by virtue of section 3(1)(c).
The Law Society and the Ombudsman submit that section 3(1)(c) of the Act
applies to the memorandum to file. Although the evidence establishes that
counsel to the Law Society created the memorandum to file in relation to
communications with an Officer of the Legislature, this record was not created
by, nor is it in the custody of, an Officer of the Legislature as required by
section 3(1)(c). I cannot accept the Ombudsman's submission that the words
"created by" include an internal record written by an employee of a public body
concerning a communication with an Officer of the Legislature. The officer for
the Ombudsman communicated with counsel for the Law Society, but the officer
did not "create" counsel's internal memorandum to file. The memorandum to file
was created by counsel to the Law Society, reflecting what she told the officer
for the Ombudsman.
I have carefully considered the concern expressed by the Law Society and the
Ombudsman that the exclusion of internal records created by employees of a
public body concerning communications with an Officer of the Legislature, from
the scope of section 3(1)(c) may lead to an anomalous result. Specifically, it
would mean that written communications from the Ombudsman concerning an
investigation would be excluded from the scope of the Act, as would the
Ombudsman's records of oral communications concerning the investigation to
outside parties. Yet a public body's records relating to oral communications
from the Ombudsman concerning the same investigation may not be excluded.
I considered this issue in Order No. 170-1997 and concluded, not without
difficulty, that the views or recommendations of an employee of an Officer of
the Legislature, made into a record under the Act by an employee of a public
body, could be protected from disclosure under section 3(1)(c). However, the
present case would require me to go even further, because the memorandum to
file does not record the views or recommendations of the officer for the
Ombudsman.
In Order No. 188-1997, I concluded that the records of interaction between the
Workers' Compensation Board and the Ombudsman were properly excluded from
disclosure on the basis of section 3(1)(c). All of the records withheld under
section 3(1)(c) in that case were correspondence exchanged between the WCB and
the Ombudsman. The difficult issue of dealing with internal documents created
by the public body did not arise.
While the Ombudsman's ongoing concern may have legitimate foundation, the
interpretation urged upon me is one which, in my view, cannot be reconciled
with the present language of section 3(1)(c). Since the memorandum to file was
not created by, nor is it in the custody of, an Officer of the Legislature, I
find that this record does not fall within the scope of section 3(1)(c) of the
Act.
However, I find that the record clearly falls within the scope of section 14
of the Act, because the author of the memorandum was acting in her capacity as
legal advisor to the Law Society. (Affidavit of Jean Whittow)
10.
Order
Section 58(1) of the Act requires me to dispose of the issues in an
inquiry by making an order under this section. I find that the search
conducted by the Law Society of British Columbia in this case was a reasonable
effort within the meaning of section 6(1).
Under section 58(3)(a), I require the Law Society of British Columbia to
perform its duty under section 6(1) to make every reasonable effort to assist
the applicant. However, since I have found that the search conducted was
reasonable, I find that the Law Society of British Columbia has complied with
this Order and discharged its duty under section 6(1) of the Act.
I also find that two of the records in dispute fall outside the scope of the
Act on the basis of section 3(1)(c). Under section 58(2)(b) of the Act, I
confirm the decision of the Law Society of British Columbia to refuse access to
these two records.
I also find that the Law Society of British Columbia was authorized to
withhold the memorandum to file on the basis of section 14 of the Act. Under
section 58(2)(b) of the Act, I confirm the decision of the Law Society of
British Columbia to refuse access to this record in dispute that has been
withheld on the basis of section 14.
February 27, 1998
David H. Flaherty
Commissioner