Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner
Province of British Columbia
Order No. 182-1997
August 13, 1997
INQUIRY RE: A review of a decision by the City of Prince George to withhold
records from Babine Investments Ltd.
Fourth Floor
1675 Douglas Street
Victoria, B.C. V8V 1X4
Telephone: 250-387-5629
Facsimile: 250-387-1696
Web Site: http://www.oipc.bc.ca
1. Description of the review
As Information and Privacy Commissioner, I conducted a written inquiry at the
Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (the Office) on June 24,
1997 under section 56 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act (the Act). This inquiry arose out of a request for a review by
Babine Investments Ltd. (the applicant) of a decision by the City of Prince
George (the City) to withhold information under sections 12(3)(b) and 14 of the
Act. The applicant has also asked me to review the City's efforts to search
for records responsive to the request, to consider whether the fee levied by
the City was appropriate, and to consider whether the City has a duty, under
section 25 of the Act, to disclose the withheld records to the applicant.
2. Documentation of the inquiry process
Counsel for the applicant made a written request to the City on
February 7, 1997 for records in six separate and detailed categories relating
to properties both owned by the applicant and adjacent to them, a specific
restrictive covenant and City By-law No. 4305. The City responded on March 6,
1997 to indicate that it would give the applicant access to some of the
requested records, that some records and information were excepted from
disclosure, and that it required payment of a $318.75 fee. The applicant paid
the requested fee and was given access to some records. The applicant wrote to
the Office on March 10, 1997 to ask for a review of the four issues described
below. The City and the applicant consented to an extension of the original
ninety-day deadline of June 9, 1997.
3. Issues under review and the burden of proof
The issues before me are: 1) whether the City properly applied sections 12(3)
and 12(4) and 14 of the Act; 2) whether the City conducted an adequate search
for records responsive to the access request; 3) whether the fee was
appropriate for the information provided; and 4) whether the City had a duty to
disclose information withheld to the applicant under section 25 of the Act.
The relevant portions of the Act read as follows:
Duty to assist applicants
6(1) The head of a public body must make every reasonable effort to assist
applicants and to respond without delay to each applicant openly, accurately
and completely.
Cabinet and local public body confidences
12(3) The head of a local public body may refuse to disclose to an applicant
information that would reveal
(b) the substance of deliberations of a meeting of its elected officials or of
its governing body or a committee of its governing body, if an Act or a
regulation under this Act authorizes holding that meeting in the absence of the
public.
(4) Subsection (3) does not apply if
(b) the information referred to in that subsection is in a record that has been
in existence for 15 or more years.
Legal advice
14. The head of a public body may refuse to disclose to an applicant
information that is subject to solicitor client privilege.
Information must be disclosed if in the public interest
25(1) Whether or not a request for access is made, the head of a public body
must, without delay, disclose to the public, to an affected group of people or
to an applicant, information
(b) the disclosure of which is, for any other reason, clearly in the public
interest.
(2) Subsection (1) applies despite any other provision of this Act.
(3) Before disclosing information under subsection (1), the head of a public
body must, if practicable, notify
(b) the commissioner.
(4) If it is not practicable to comply with subsection (3), the head of the
public body must mail a notice of disclosure in the prescribed form
(b) to the commissioner.
Section 57 of the Act establishes the burden of proof on the parties in an
inquiry. Under section 57(1), where access to information in the record has
been refused, it is up to the public body, in this case the City, to prove that
the applicant has no right of access to the records.
Section 57 is silent with respect to a request for review about the duty to
assist under section 6 of the Act. I decided in Order No. 110-1996, June 5,
1996, that the burden of proof is on the public body to demonstrate it has
discharged its duty under section 6 of the Act.
Section 57 of the Act is also silent with respect to a request for review
about a public body's decision not to apply section 25 of the Act to disclose
records. As I decided in Order No. 162-1997, May 9, 1997 (a matter involving
the same applicant and public body), I am of the view that the burden of proof
is on the applicant with respect to
section 25.
4. Discussion
I have dealt previously with similar issues in Order No. 162-1997. I
will now deal separately with each of the four issues raised by the
applicant.
Issue 1: The City's application of sections 12(3) and
14
Section 12(3)(b): local public body confidences
The record in dispute is a two-page memo dated January 22,
1997.
The applicant submits that the City applied section 12(3)(b) of the Act in
error and wrongly severed information in two ways. The applicant argues that
the language of this section requires a specific Act to authorize holding of a
meeting in the absence of the public. (Submission of the Applicant, p. 3; and
Reply Submission of the Applicant,
pp. 2-5) I agree with the City's submissions that section 220 of the
Municipal Act and Consolidated Council Procedures By-law No.
4912, 1989, authorized the City to conduct the meeting in the absence of
the public. (See Submission of the City, p. 4; and Reply Submission of the
City, p. 2)
The applicant also argues that the severing does not fall within the meaning
of the "substance of deliberations" of a meeting as I discussed the term in
connection with meetings of the provincial Cabinet in Order No. 48-1995, July
7, 1995. It believes that the term "should be restricted to minutes of Council
and nothing more." (Submission of the Applicant, pp. 3-5) I do not accept
that, for purposes of section 12(3)(b) of the Act, the phrase "substance of
deliberations" should be so narrowly construed as to apply only to "minutes of
Council and nothing more." There is nothing in section 12(3) which would
support such a restrictive interpretation of the provision. I am satisfied
that the severed portion of the document dated January 27, 1997 reflects the
substance of the in camera deliberations of the City, and that the City
was entitled to withhold this information on that basis. (See also Reply
Submission of the City, pp. 2, 3)
In addition, I see no reason to invite the City to reconsider its use of its
discretion not to disclose this record. (Submission of the Applicant, pp. 5-8;
see also the Submission of the City, pp. 4, 5) In my view, the record is also
not an appropriate document for severing.
Section 14: Legal advice
The records in dispute are two letters between the City and a Prince George
law firm in 1994 and 1997 respectively.
The information severed by the City concerns confidential communications
between it and its solicitor for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. On the
basis of my own review of these records, I can confirm that they have this
particular character, and that the City was within its authority under the Act
to choose to withhold the records.
(See Submission of the City, p. 5; and Reply Submission of the City, pp. 3,
4)
In addition, I see no reason to invite the City to reconsider its use of its
discretion not to release this record. (Submission of the Applicant, pp. 5-8)
Given the applicant's February 6, 1997 Notice to the City under section 755 of
the Municipal Act, I am satisfied that the City has good reason not to
exercise its discretion in favour of disclosure. (Reply Submission of the
City, p. 4) Solicitor-client privilege applies to the whole of the record.
Severance is therefore inappropriate.
Issue 2: Adequacy of a search
The applicant submits that the City did not conduct an adequate search for
records responsive to his request, since it did not provide all of the records
in its possession or under its control. He refers in particular to two letters
submitted on his behalf to the City in January 1997 and to the lack of evidence
of the Council's instructions to set up a meeting with respect to the issues
raised in the applicant's correspondence with the City.
The City's specific submission is that its response to or dealings with the
two letters were outside the time frame of the applicant's request. According
to the City, the two letters
...would not have been considered [by Council in camera] until the 10th
of February, after the request for information had been made. Accordingly, the
City's response would not include a record of these items being received or
dealt with by Mayor and Council. (Submission of the City, p.3)
In addition, the record that would indicate the City's instructions were
excepted from disclosure under the Act. (Submission of the City, p.3)
The City's general response is that the applicant was seeking all of the
records described in its own original request, except for records of tax
notices and utility bills. Thus a "substantial amount of time and effort was
spent by the various City Departments and Divisions manually searching files
and record logs for records responsive to the applicant's request."
(Submission of the City, pp. 2, 3)
I find that the City conducted a reasonable search in the context of the
demands of this applicant.
Issue 3: Reasonableness of fees
The applicant submits that the fee of $318.75 imposed by the City pursuant to
section 75 of the Act was inappropriate and unreasonable. First, the applicant
says it was inappropriate and unreasonable for the City to copy documents which
it had submitted to the City: "The applicant feels that the City of Prince
George ought to have confirmed with the applicant whether the applicant wanted
copies of such information." Second, the applicant says is that the time spent
locating and retrieving the records (five hours) and preparing them for
disclosure (seven hours) is unreasonable and out of proportion to an amount it
paid in its first request for information. (Submission of the Applicant,
pp. 14, 15) The applicant did not request a fee waiver or reduction under
section 75(5) of the Act.
I have already indicated above that the applicant refused to narrow his
request for records. As the City states: "The applicant's own records clearly
fall within the scope of the request." (Submission of the City, p. 5) With
respect to the total amount and time charged, the City submits that:
The amount the City has charged the applicant for responding to this request is
considerably less than the actual time spent locating, retrieving, copying,
reviewing, and preparing the records for disclosure. (Submission of the City,
p. 6; see also Reply Submission of the City, p. 5)
The applicant believes that the City should have submitted memos from the
various departments to substantiate its submissions. However, given the small
number of hours involved and the limited amounts of money, I am of the opinion
that it would be excessive to require the City to do so in this inquiry.
(Reply Submission of the Applicant, p. 7)
I find that the fees charged by the City to the applicant under section 75 of
the Act are not unreasonable.
Issue 4: Section 25: Public interest paramount
I have already discussed the meaning and relevance of this section to this
kind of local dispute in Order No. 162-1997. At pages 3 and 4 of that Order, I
wrote:
I find that the applicant has misunderstood the meaning of `public interest' in
the context of this particular inquiry. The records in dispute concern a
private matter affecting the interests of Babine Investments Ltd., its tenants,
and adjacent residents and property owners. The interests of the parties
seeking disclosure do not rise to the level of public interest as defined by
section 25 of the Act. Moreover, I defer to the similar determination of the
City of Prince George on this matter. In my view, the facts in this inquiry do
not meet the test of urgency and vital communication implied by the language of
section 25. The fact that some members of the public might be interested in an
issue does not necessarily make it a matter `clearly in the public interest.'
Despite the submissions of the applicant, which I have carefully reviewed, I
have concluded that disclosure of the withheld information is not required in
the public interest for purposes of section 25(1) of the Act. (Submission of
the Applicant, pp. 8-13; see also Submission of the City, p. 7) I agree with
the City that the records in dispute concern what is essentially a private
matter rather than one of significant public concern. (Reply Submission of the
City, p. 5) The solution to the applicant's problems with "the fence in
question" do not lie in a mandatory disclosure of records under this section of
the Act. Nor am I in a position to order the City to enforce a Bylaw and a
Restrictive Covenant.
8.
Order
Issue 1: Sections 12(3)(b) and 14
I find that the head of the City of Prince George is authorized to refuse
access to information in the records in dispute under sections 12(3)(b) and 14
of the Act. Under section 58(2)(b), I confirm the decision of the head of the
City to refuse access to these records.
Issue 2: Adequacy of the search for records
I also find that the search for records conducted by the head of the City of
Prince George was adequate within the meaning of section 6(1) of the Act.
Under section 58(3)(a), I require the head of the City to perform his duty to
assist the applicant. However, since I have found that the head of the City
has made every reasonable effort to search for records, I find that the head of
the City has complied with this Order and has discharged his duty under
section 6(1).
Issue 3: Reasonableness of the fees
I also find that the head of the City of Prince George complied with
section 75(1) of the Act and section 7 of the Regulation with respect to the
calculation of the fee in this case. Under section 58(3)(c), I confirm the
decision of the head of the City on the fees charged in this case.
Issue 4: Section 25
I also find that the head of the City of Prince George has acted properly in
refusing to apply section 25 of the Act pursuant to the applicant's request. I
make no order in this respect other than to note that the applicant has not
satisfied me that the application of section 25 to the records in issue is
warranted under the Act.
August 13, 1997
David H. Flaherty
Commissioner